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The analysis by international trade theorists of factor market imperfec- 
tions, and alternative policy rankings in the presence thereof, has distin- 
guished between two major, polar types: (i) a distortionary wage differen- 
tial between two sectors, while the wage is perfectly flexible in each sector; 
and (ii) a sticky (or minimum) wage which is equal, however, between the 
two sectors. 
The analysis of the former class of distortions was pioneered by Hagen 
[7] and has subsequently been extensively explored by Bhagwati and 
Ramaswami [3], Kemp and Negishi [9], and Bhagwati, Ramaswami and 
Srinivasan [2]. 
The analysis of the second class of distortions was pioneered by 
Gottfried Haberler [6] and has subsequently been extended fully for the 
traditional two-sector model of trade theory by Brecher [5]. 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze policy rankings in the presence 
of a yet different type of factor market imperfection, introduced in a 
pioneering paper by Harris and Todaro [S] which combines specificity 
of wages (in one sector) with a (resulting) wage differential between the 
two sectors in an ingenious manner. In earlier papers [3,4], we have 
analyzed the Harris-Todaro model, for this range of issues, in the context 
of a closed economy or a “small,” open economy with given terms of 
trade. In this paper, we analyze alternative policy rankings in the context 
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of the fully general assumption of a “large” country, which has monopoly 
power in trade. 
Section 1 outlines the model. Section 2 briefly outlines the principal 
results of our analysis. Section 3 analyzes the policy instrument defined 
by a wage subsidy in the sector with minimum wages. Section 4 discusses 
the policy instrument defined by a production tax-cum-subsidy. Section 5 
analyzes the policy instrument defined by a consumption tax-cum-subsidy. 
Section 6 discusses a tariff policy. Finally, Section 7 derives the combina- 
tion of policies yielding the first-best optimum. 
1. THE MODEL 
The basic Harris-Todaro model consists of a set of relations which can 
be stated as follows. 
There are two commodities (A and M), produced in quantitites X, and 
X, , using L, and L, units of labor, with strictly concave production 
functions. (Thus, implicitly, there is a second factor (KA , KM) which yields 
the diminishing returns to labor input.) 
Next, with the fixed, overall labor supply assumed by choice of units to 
equal unity, we have 
L-4 + L, < 1, (3) 
LA 3 L* 2 0. (4) 
We now introduce foreign trade. Let E denote net exports of the 
agricultural good, exchanging for g(E) of net imports of manufacturing. 
(Since we do not wish to prejudge the question as to which commodity 
will be imported, E is allowed to take on negative values as well, in which 
case g(E) will also be negative. In such a case, agricultural goods will be 
imported and manufactured goods will be exported.) We further assume 
that g(0) = 0, g’ > 0, g” < 0. This implies that the marginal (g’) and 
average (g/E) terms of trade decline as E increases and the marginal is less 
than the average. The domestic consumption of the two commodities 
will then be 
C, = X, - E, (5) 
CM = XM + g(E). (6) 
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It is well known that if we now add a standard utility function 
u = UC, 9 Cd, (7) 
where U is concave with positive marginal utilities for finite [C,, , CM], 
neoclassical free trade equilibrium will be characterized by 
&I u2 = f.‘l!!Ar, (8) 
Glu, = &WE (9) 
together with (l)-(6) being satisfied (where U, and U, represent the partial 
derivatives of U with respect to C,4 and C,vI , respectively, and fi’ is the 
derivation of h with respect to its argument, i = A, M). (We rule out 
corner solutions by assumingf,‘(O) = j&‘(O) = m.) 
Figure 1 shows the production possibility curve BJ and the foreign 
offer curve PDC superimposed on it at P a la Baldwin. At the production 
0 ~- --___ J - *a 
FIGURE 1 
point P, the price ratio faced by producers (i.e., the negative of the slope 
of PC) is the same as the marginal rate of substitution in production as 
represented by the (negative of the) slope of the tangent to the production 
possibility curve at P. At the consumption point C, this price ratio equals 
the marginal rate of substitution in consumption as represented by the 
(negative of the) slope of the indifference curve at C. (The production and 
consumption points are so located that the price ratio equals the external 
terms of trade. The curve PDC corresponds to the graph of g(E).) 
The Harris-Todaro problem of sector-specific rigid wages and resulting 
unemployment can now be readily introduced. Let the free trade solution 
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above (at P and C in Fig. 1) be Xa*, X,,,,*, LA*, LM* (= 1 - L.., *), 
E*, C..,“, CM*. Assume now, however, that there is an exogenously 
specified, minimum wage constraint in manufacturing, such that 
w > w, (10) 
where w is the wage in manufacturing, in units of the manufacturing good 
(1M). For a competitive economy, this implies that 
This constraint becomes binding, and P in Fig. 1 is inadmissible, when 
The competitive economy, when characterized by this wage constraint, 
will then experience unemployment of labor, We then have two options to 
characterize the labor market equilibrium in this situation: either assume 
that the wage in agriculture (A) will be equalized with the wage in manu- 
facturing (M) despite the unemployment; or that the wage in agriculture 
will be equalized with the expected wage in manufacturing, the expected 
and the actual wage in manufacturing being different as the former would 
be defined, as the latter weighted by the rate of employment, i.e. 
WL,I(l - LA), 
where L.%, < (1 - LA) when there is unemployment. 
The analysis of Harris-Todaro is based on the latter assumption, so 
that we can then write the equilibrium production conditions in competi- 
tion and laissez-faire, as follows. 
f&,’ = G, (11) 
(WWfA = ~Ld(l - LA), (12) 
WJ, = AWE. (13) 
We assume, in (12) that the production and consumption prices for the 
agricultural good are the same. (In writing Eq. (ll), we assume that the 
producer and consumer prices of the manufacturing good are identical, 
with wage G paid in kind. Hence, the effect of a production subsidy to 
manufacturing is essentially not to affect any real decisions, as those made 
via equations (11) and (12), but merely to increase each commodity price 
in terms of the (arbitrary) unit of account. However, if we were to assume 
instead that the producer and consumer prices of the manufacturing good 
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could be made to differ by policy, then the worker in manufacturing would 
earn the value of his marginal product at the producer price and then, qua 
consumer, must have enough income (in terms of the unit of account) to 
buy W units of the manufacturing good. In that case, a wage subsidy policy 
to manufacturing would be equivalent to a production subsidy policy to 
manufacturing, as is the case in the agricultural sector. Thus, note that, if 
we did shift to the latter, alternative assumption on wage payment in the 
manufacturing sector, then the analysis would not change but our policy 
equivalences would. In particular, the first best optimal policy mix would 
then include a uniform production subsidy to both sectors, and a produc- 
tion subsidy in manufacturing and a wage subsidy in agriculture.) Given 
ii;, we can solve (1 l), (12) and (13) for L, , L, , and E after setting X, = 
L&L), J’, =fM&J, CA =fA(L.J ~ E and CM = fd-Ld + gU3. The 
equilibrium production point corresponding to this situation of non- 
intervention, with unemployment, will then lie, in Fig. 1, along RK (where 
X,, and hence, LM are fixed at the value that makes fM’ = %) at Q. (It is 
worth noting that the nonintervention equilibrium would lie along RK 
even if we assumed actual wages to be equalized between the two sectors.) 
The consumption point will be at F. 
The policy question that emerges then, is: What alternative policies can 
be used in this model for intervention and what would be their impact on 
welfare and on unemployment? 
2. THE BASIC RESULTS 
In this model, there are a number of policy options which can be 
explored; however, many can be shown to be equivalent to one another or 
to combinations of other policies. 
Thus, we will discuss the following policies: (i) nonintervention or 
laissez-faire; (ii) wage subsidy in manufacturing (M); (iii) production 
subsidy to agriculture (A); and (iv) consumption subsidy to agriculture (A). 
Note that, as a little reflection will show, the simple structure of the 
model implies that: (v) a wage subsidy in agriculture is equivalent to 
policy (iii); (vi) a uniform wage tax-cum-subsidy in all employment is a 
combination of policies (ii) and (iii); and (vii) a tariff policy is a combina- 
tion of policies (iii) and (iv). 
We will proceed to establish the following propositions. 
THEOREM 1. There exists a unique equilibrium corresponding to each 
wage subsidy s to manufacturing in an interval [0, $1. At S, fill employment 
is reached. 
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THEOREM 2. A wage subsidy (in manufacturing) will exist which will 
improve welfare over laissez-faire. 
Thus, laissez-faire (i.e., wage subsidy = 0) can be necessarily improved 
upon by some wage subsidy. In fact, any positive subsidy in some interval 
with zero as its left end point will be welfare-improving. 
THEOREM 3. The full-employment wage subsidy S may not be the 
“second-best” wage subsidy and may be inferior even to laissez-faire. 
THEOREM 4. There exists a unique production subsidy which will 
enable full employment to be reached and which is also the second-best 
production subsidy. 
THEOREM 5. The second-best wage subsidy (to manufacturing) and 
production subsidy (to agriculture) cannot be ranked uniquely. 
THEOREM 6. There exists a unique consumption subsidy which will 
enable full employment to be reached and which is also the second-best 
consumption subsidy. 
THEOREM 7. The second-best wage subsidy (to manufacturing) and the 
second-best consumption subsidy (to agriculture) cannot be ranked uniquely. 
THEOREM 8. The second-best production and consumption subsidies 
cannot be ranked uniquely. 
THEOREM 9. A tariff (or trade subsidy) policy may not improve werfare 
but can improve employment. 
THEOREM 10. The jrst-best optimum can be reached if, in addition to 
the monopoly-power-in-trade tariff, a combination of a production tax-cum- 
subsidy and wage subsidy (to manufacturing) or any equivalent thereof 
(including a uniform wage subsidy on employment of labor in both sectors), 
is provided. 
The combination of a suitable production subsidy to agriculture plus an 
appropriate wage subsidy in manufacturing, or its equivalents, such as a 
uniform wage subsidy in all employment, will yield the first-best optimum, 
when also combined with an appropriate tariff to exploit the postulated 
monopoly power in trade (as discussed in Section 7). 
642/11/3-4 
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3. WAGE SUBSIDY IN MANUFACTURING 
Let us now consider the wage subsidy as the policy intervention in this 
economy. Denoting by s the subsidy per unit of labor employed in manu- 
facturing, we find that the equilibrium is now characterized by 
fnr’ = w  - s, (14) 
t,WU2)f4 = ~LfI(1 - LA (15) 
VJAJJ = AVE. (16) 
Equation (14) assumes that each worker in manufacturing receives 
remuneration W, of which only (W - s) is paid by the employer and s by 
the state out of some form of nondistortionary taxation. With the con- 
sumer and producer price of the agricultural good assumed to be identical, 
and equal to U,/lJ, , we then have the actual wage in agriculture being 
equated to the employment-rate-weighted (i.e., expected) wage in manu- 
facturing in Eq. (15). 
Existence of equilibrium is established once we show that values of LA , 
L and E exist that satisfy (14)-(16) and the conditions that (i) LA and 
Lz ‘are nonnegative and their sum does not exceed the available labor 
force, namely, unity; and (ii) the value of E is such that whichever com- 
modity is exported, the volume of exports does not exceed production. We 
now proceed to show that, in fact, unique values of LA , L, and E exist 
that satisfy all the above conditions. In doing so, we shall use, in addition 
to the assumptions already made, the assumption that both goods are 
normal in consumption. 
Denoting the average terms of trade g(E)/E by 4(E), we see that our 
assumptions on g imply that 4 > 0, 4 < 0, and g’ < C$ for all E. Sub- 
stituting (16) into (15) we get 
W)fA’ = ~Ld(l - LA). (15') 
Given W, s, concavity of fM, and the assumption that fM’ -+ cc as 
L, + 0, Eq. (14) uniquely determines L, as a function L,(s) of s for all 
s in 0 < s < W. Given the value L&v) for L, , the range of feasible values 
of L, is [0, 1 - L&v)]. For any value of LA in this range, the feasible 
values of E are confined to the interval [g-l{ -fM(LM(s))},f(LA)], the 
reason being that if A is exported the volume of exports E cannot exceed 
the production f(L,J and if A is imported, then -E is the value of exports 
of M. The physical volume of exports of M is -g(E) and this cannot 
exceed the production f&L,(s)). Thus -g(E) <fM(LM(s)) or 
E 3 g-l{ -fZc&))l~ 
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where g-l is the inverse function of g. We first show that given any feasible 
LA there exists a unique, feasible E that satisfies (16). We then substitute 
this value of E (denoting it E(LA , s) to indicate its dependence on the 
specified values of L, and s) into the left-hand side of (15’) and show that 
a unique feasible value of LA satisfies (15’). 
Now consider (16). The right-hand side is a decreasing function of E 
while the left-hand side is an increasing function of E for given values of L, 
and L&J), since 
(6u,, + U,,g’) u2 - c-u,, -c Uzg’) u, > o =- 
U,2 
by virtue of the facts that g’ > 0 and the normality assumptions ensure 
that Uli,,U2 - U,,U, > 0 and U,,U, - U,,U, < 0. Further, as E 
approaches its lowest feasible value, the volume of exports of the manu- 
factured good approaches its production; the result is that its domestic 
consumption C&[ approaches zero. Similarly, as E approaches its highest 
feasible value, the domestic consumption CA of the agricultural good 
approaches zero. Now, if we assume that the marginal utility U,(U,) of 
agricultural good (manufactured good) tends to co as its consumption 
C,(C,) tends to zero, the left-hand side of (16) increases from zero to 
+ cc as E increases from its lower to upper limiting value and hence, 
given s, for any feasible LA there exists a unique E denoted by E(L., , s) 
which satisfies (16). 
It is easily seen that BE(L, , s)/aL, > 0. For, given s (and hence, A’,) 
and a feasible E (and hence, CM), C, increases as LA increases resulting in 
a decrease in UJU, (given our assumption of normality for both goods). 
Thus, as LA increases, the graph of the left-hand side of (16) shifts to the 
right while the graph of the right-hand side stays put, resulting in a larger 
value for the E at which the two graphs intersect. The reader can readily 
verify, using a similar argument, that aE/as < 0. 
Let us now substitute the function E(L, , S) for E in (15’). Then, for any 
given S, both sides of (15’) are functions of L, only. The left-hand side of 
(15’) is then a decreasing function of L, since 
because q3 > 0. $’ < 0, BE/aL, > 0, and f 1(1 < 0. The right-hand side is an 
increasing function of L, . Further, as L, + 0, the left-hand side (i.e., 
+fA') also --f 00, and hence, exceeds the right-hand side which takes the 
value EL&,(S). Hence, if we show that as LA + its maximum feasible value 
1 - L.&S), the left-hand side is less than the right-hand side, we would 
have shown the existence of a unique feasible L, satisfying (15’). 
Consider s = 0. Then L,(O) satisfies&’ = i?. By assumption, L,* (the 
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laissez-faire value of L, without the minimum wage constraint) results in 
fM’ < i7 and hence, L,* > LM(0). This means that LA* = 1 - L,* < 
1 - L,,,,(O). Thus if we set L, = 1 - LM(0), its maximum feasible value 
given s = 0, the following hold true: 
(9 fA’V - L&9) <fA’(L*) (concavity offA) ; 
(ii) EU - LdO), 01 > EW - LA,*), O> (since BE/BL, > 0) ; 
(iii) +[E{l - L.&O), O}] < &E(l - LM*, 0}] (since 4’ < 0). 
Thus, +fA’ (left-hand side of (15’)) evaluated at the largest feasible value of 
L, (given s = 0), i.e., at 1 - LM(0), is less than its value evaluated at 
LA = 1 - L&f*. But at L.4 = 1 - L,*, +fA‘ = wllG2)fA’ =fM’ < @. 
Hence, a fortiori, the value of +fA’ at L, = 1 - L,,,,(O) is less than W. This 
in turn implies that, for s = 0, the graphs of the two sides of (15’) intersect 
at a unique L, between zero and 1 - LM(0), as shown in Fig. 2. 
I-LM(0) L* 
FIGURE 2 
Thus we have established the existence of a unique laissez-faire equili- 
brium with unemployment under the minimum wage constraint. 
Existence of Unique Equilibrium for Each Value of s in [0, li) 
Now, as s is increased, for any given LA the left-hand side of (15’) 
increases, since (8/&)(+fA’) = ~$‘f~‘(aE/&) > 0, and hence, its graph 
shifts to the right. The right-hand side also increases since LM(s) increases 
with S. Thus, its graph shifts to the left, with its value at LA = 1 - LM(s) 
always equal to F. Hence, the two graphs continue to intersect at a unique 
LA in the interval (0, 1 - L&Y)) as s increases up to a maximum value f, 
when this value of LA equals its upper bound 1 - L&f)), and full employ- 
ment is reached. This is shown in Fig. 3. For values of s > S, no 
equilibrium exists. Thus, we have shown the existence of a unique equili- 
brium for each value of s in [0, $1. 





Impact on Welfare of Change in s 
Let us now evaluate the change in welfare, i.e., dU/ds, as s increases. 
After some manipulation, the following can be derived, 
dE -=- 
ds [I 





D = +'fA' aLA -q$) + I#; - (1 :L;A)2 /I+ -&($)I ' C20) 
N= [-+ I#; - (1 FLTAj2 \ - #'&(fA')2 - w4!A'g' 
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Now, if we assume normality of both goods in consumption, then 
Further, 4 > 0, $’ < 0, fA’ > 0, j; < 0, fhI' > 0 and U, > 0. Hence, 
D > 0. It is seen that dE/ds < 0, i.e., the net export of the agricultural 
commodity decreases as the wage subsidy to manufacturing increases. 
However, the signs of dL,/ds and dU/ds are in general indeterminate. But, 
using the fact that the marginal terms of trade g’ is by assumption less 
than the average terms of trade 4, we can show that 
In the above inequality, all terms involving s explicitly are negative and 
the rest are positive. When s = 0, the terms involving s drop out making 
N and hence, dU/ds > 0 at s = 0. By continuity this means that welfare 
can be increased over its laissez-faire level by giving any positive wage 
subsidy in an interval. It is also clear that the full-employment wage 
subsidy need not be the second-best optimum subsidy. 
4. PRODUCTION SUBSIDY 
We now consider the policy of subsidizing production in agriculture. To 
do this, we rewrite the critical equilibrium conditions as follows: 
fM’ = i3, (2.3 
T,fA' = ZL,/(l - LA), (23) 
WU, = W), (24) 
where r9 is the producer’s price of the agricultural good, the production 
subsidy being (rTTI, - $)/c$ per unit. 
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Now (22) determines Lb1 uniquely as LM(0) (its laissez-faire value). The 
feasible values of LA then lie in the interval [O, 1 - LM(0)]. Equation (24) 
is the same as (16) when s = 0 and hence, for any feasible LA , there exists 
a unique E(L, , 0) which satisfies (24) and clearly aE/BLA > 0. Now the 
left-hand side of (23) is a decreasing function of LA (for any given 7~~) and 
the right-hand side is an increasing function of LA . We have already seen 
that when 7~~ is at its laissez-faire value, the graphs of the two sides inter- 
sect at a unique LA(O) such that 0 < LA(O) < 1 - LM(0). Now, as we 
increase rD continuously above its laissez-faire value, thus increasing the 
rate of production subsidy, the graph of the left-hand side of (23) shifts 
to the right and continues to intersect the right-hand side (which does not 
shift) at a feasible value of L, until rrB reaches a value 5, at which the 
intersection occurs at L, = 1 - L&,(O). At this point, full employment is 
attained; and for values of rrp > 77, , no equilibrium exists. 
It is also clear that as 7rD increases, LA increases and hence, X, increases, 
i.e., dL,/drr, > 0 and dX,Jdr, = fA'(dLA/dnB) > 0. It can thus be shown 
that 
> 0. (25) 
Hence, clearly the second-best optimum production subsidy is the full- 
employment subsidy (which is the maximum, feasible subsidy). 
5. CONSUMPTION SUBSIDY 
We now consider the policy of subsidizing the consumption of agri- 
cultural goods. To do this, we must rewrite the equilibrium conditions as 
follows, 
fnr’ = w, (26) 
W)h' = ~-L/U - LA), (27) 
nc = wu, 3 (28) 
where nTT, is the consumer’s price of agricultural good, the consumption 
subsidy being (4(E) - Z-J/~, per unit. 
Now, consider (28). For any given LA , the right-hand side is an 
increasing function of E. Further, as E tends to its lower limiting value of 
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g-‘{-&&,(O))}, U,/U, tends to zero; and as E tends to its upper limiting 
value of fA(LA), U,jU, -+ co. Hence, for any positive rrC , there exists a 
unique E denoted by E(L, , Z-J that satisfies (28). It is also clear that 
BE(L, , rJ/aL, > 0 and BE(L, , ~,)/a~, > 0. 
Substituting E(L A , Z-J for E in (27), we find that, for a given Z-, , the 
left-hand side of (27) is a decreasing function of L, while the right-hand 
side is an increasing function. 
We have already seen (in Section 3) that when 7re equals its laissez-faire 
value, the graph of the two sides of (27) will intersect at a unique LA(O), 
satisfying 0 < LA(O) < 1 - L,+,(O). Furthermore, as we decrease 7rC, thus 
increasing the rate of consumption subsidy, the graph of the left-hand side 
will shift to the right, while the graph of the right-hand side stays put. 
Hence, until 7rC reaches a value ii,, the two graphs will intersect at a 
feasible value of LA ; and at ii, , they will intersect at LA = 1 - LM(0). 
For any lower value of rTT,, there is no equilibrium. 
It is also obvious that the equilibrium value of LA (and hence, X,) 
increases as rrTT, decreases, i.e., dLAldzrc < 0 and dX,/dn, < 0. It can thus 
be shown that 
dE - -= 
dnc E (1 TLF.J’ 
(since g’ < 4). (30) 
This means that, as r, decreases from its laissez-faire value to its full- 
employment value *., , welfare increases. Thus, the full employment sub- 
sidy is also the second-best consumption subsidy. 
6. TRADE TARIFF (SUBSIDY) 
Let us now consider a tariff policy. The equilibrium will now be charac- 
terized by 
fM’ = 65, (31) 
&9(1 + t)fA’ = WL,l(l - LA (32) 
WG. = KW + 0, (33) 
where I is the ad valorem tariff rate. If the agricultural commodity is 
exported (imported), i.e., E is positive (negative), then t represents an 
export subsidy (import duty). 
As earlier, L,,, is uniquely determined at L&O) by (31). From the argu- 
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ment of Section 3, it follows that for any given t and LA in the feasible 
range (0, 1 - L&O)}, there exists a unique feasible E(LA , t) that satisfies 
(33). It is also clear that 
%E - (vLA)(wV,) 




(WW(U,/V,> - d’(l + t> > ” 
Substituting E(L, , t) for E in (32), we then see that the left-hand side is 
a decreasing function of LA while the right-hand side is an increasing 
function of LA . We know that, when t = 0, the graphs of the two sides 
intersect at a unique LA(O) in (0, 1 - LM(0)}. As we increase t above zero, 
the graph of the left-hand side shifts to the right while that of the right- 
hand side stays put, so that the two graphs continue to intersect at an LA 
in the feasible range until t reaches a value i when the intersection occurs 
at LA = 1 - LM(0), thereby attaining full employment. For t > I, there 
is no equilibrium. 
Furthermore, as t increases, equilibrium L, increases. It can then be 
shown that 
dLA @A’ WW( W W -= 
dt 
[4’(1 + t) - & (+g)/ 1 Cj(l + t)f,” - WLM(o) 
(1 - LAY 
1 
+ fA’#(l + t) g (+g) 
A 2 1 
$ = $b [-fA’ & (2) + wLM’o) 
(1 - LA)’ 
- +(I + t)j;] 
x +/fAr& (+) > 0, 
dV -= u, 
dt ! 
fA'+L 




Now, (36) shows clearly that the change in welfare dV/dt is the sum of two 
terms consisting of a production effect UzfA’&l + t)(dLA/dt) and a 
consumption and trade effect V,{ g’ - +(I + t)}(dE/dt). The production 
effect is unambiguously positive. Since V, > 0 and dE/dt > 0, the sign of 
the trade effect depends on that of g’ - +(I + t). By assumption, g’ < 4 
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and hence, g’ - +(l + t) < -t+. For nonnegative values of t the con- 
sumption effect is therefore negative while for negative values of t it 
depends on whether g’ exceeds or falls short of 4 (1 + t). Thus we cannot 
assert anything in generd about the welfare effect of a tariff. However, as 
we said earlier, L, and hence, total employment L, + LM(0) increases 
monotonically as the tariff is increased and full employment is reached at i. 
7. OPTIMAL POLICY INTERVENTION 
We may now briefly state the combination of policies which would 
yield the first-best optimum in this model. 
Thus, let t* be the optimal tariff and s* the optimal wage subsidy in all 
employment, which would obtain at the optimal equilibrium. We would 
then be meeting the constraints of the model as follows. 
fhl’ = w  - s*, (37) 
cj(E)(l + t*)fA’ = CL’ - s*, (38) 
$&9(1 + t*> = WJ, , (39) 
and 
g’(E) = GIG = h’ifa’. (40) 
The diagrammatic counterpart of this optimal equilibrium is shown in 
Fig. 4, where the optimal wage subsidy is supposed, along with the optimal 
FIGURE 4 
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tariff, to lead to production at P* (tangent to production price-ratio n9*), 
consumption at C* (tangent to identical consumption price-ratio nTc* = 
*D * = #E)(l + t*)) and international terms of trade $(E) equal to 
P*C*. The utility function is then maximized at value U*. 
It is readily seen, of course, that the uniform wage subsidy s* could be 
given equivalently as wage subsidy to manufacturing alone, as rate s*, plus 
a suitable production subsidy to agriculture, and so on. To derive other 
equivalences, the reader can refer to our earlier discussion of this subject 
in Section 2. 
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